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NOTES AND COMMENTS
EQUITY'S ENFORCEMENT OF LiFE INSURANCE TRUSTS
The validity of life insurance trusts presents a modern problem
for judicial consideration. In recent years such trusts have de-
veloped with astonishing rapidity into a popular mode of con-
trolling the future disposition of funds. Since 1920 the use of
life insurance trusts has grown so that at the present time over
four billion dollars worth of life insurance is held in trusts.1
The prominence which this use has achieved during these recent
years is due largely to the fact that it furnishes an excellent
means of providing for the maintenance and welfare of depend-
ents after the death of the insured. In establishing this type
of trust, the settlor, in effect, sets up the machinery whereby
a fund will come into existence at his death to be disposed of by
the trustee in accordance with the wishes of the settlor as specified
in the trust agreement.
In the usual case, the insured enters into an agreement with
a trustee, whereby the latter is appointed beneficiary under the
policy of insurance, the premiums of which are in most instances
paid by the settlor. The trustee agrees to hold the policy during
the lifetime of the insured, and upon the latter's death to receive
the proceeds of the policy from the insurance company for ad-
ministration in accordance with the wishes of the insured. In
some instances the trustee is provided with funds with which to
pay the premiums on the policy, in which case a sufficient prop-
erty interest is given to the trustee to support the trust. This
type of trust agreement is referred to as a "funded life insurance
trust." In the vast majority of cases, however, the insured agrees
to pay the premiums, so that the only res upon which to predicate
a trust, which the trustee receives, is the probability that a fund
will come into existence upon the death of the insured. Where
the insured does not possess the right to change the beneficiary
without the consent of the trustee, the latter takes a vested in-
terest, which is sufficient to support a trust, even though the
insured can defeat it by failure to pay the premiums, thereby caus-
ing ultimately a cancellation of the policy and the consequent de-
struction of the trust. However, where the insured retains the
right to change the beneficiary at will, a serious question arises
as to whether the trustee, as beneficiary under the policy, pos-
sesses such an interest therein as can properly be called a prop-
erty right. If the interest which the beneficiary possesses under
I Bogert on Trusts (West Pub. Co., 1935), II, 763.
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a revocable life insurance policy does not possess any attributes
of property, the trust must fail because of the inadequacy of a
sufficient res, and the attempted disposition of funds by the settlor
to take effect upon his death by the use of this device is invalid
because the trust agreement was not executed in conformity with
the requirements of the statute of wills.
The highly technical character of a life insurance contract; the
innumerable forms into which it is cast, and the widely varying
situations under which they have been made subject to examina-
tion by the courts have resulted in much confusion of thought
where an attempt was made to define or characterize the nature of
the interest which the insured and the beneficiary possess therein.
In a great many cases it has been held that the beneficiary ac-
quires a qualified vested interest, subject to being divested by the
act of the insured.2 The majority of the decisions appear to hold
that the beneficiary under such a policy acquires no vested right,
but only an expectancy. 8 However, most of the cases did not
involve the validity of a life insurance trust, but arose under
varying circumstances which justified the court's decision because
of the nature of the facts presented. It has been held that a bene-
ficiary has nothing which he can assign ;4 that he does not possess
anything which would pass by operation of law to the trustee in
bankruptcy ;5 that he does not possess any power to prevent a
change of the beneficiary by the insured ;6 that he has nothing
devisable or descendible ;7 that he has no right to maintain an
action for anticipatory breach,8 and that he has no such interest
in the policy as to preclude pledge of the policy by the insured.9
On the other hand, it is well settled that the insured has a prop-
2 Vance on Insurance (2d ed., West Pub. Co., 1930), p. 562, sec. 147. See
also Indiana Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 180 Ind. 9, 101 N. E. 289
(1913) ; Sullivan v. Maroney, 77 N. J. Eq. 565, 78 A. 150 (1910) ; Anderson
v. Broad St. Nat. Bank, 90 N. J. Eq. 78, 105 A. 599 (1918); Kochaneck v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 262 Mass. 174, 159 N. E. 520 (1928) ; Allen v. Home
Nat. Bank, 120 Conn. 306, 180 A. 498 (1935).
8 Vance on Insurance (2d ed., West Pub. Co., 1930), p. 562, sec. 147.
4 Carpenter v. Knapp, 101 Iowa 712, 70 N. W. 764 (1897) ; Mutual
Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Swett, 222 F. 200 (1915) ; Dorsett v. Thomas, 152
La. 60, 192 So. 734 (1922) ; Hicks v. Life Ins. Co., 166 Iowa 532, 147 N. W.
883 (1914).
5 In re Hogan, 194 F. 846 (1912).
6 Citizen's Nat. Bank v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 141 So. 481 (La.
App., 1932).
7 In re Hammer, 169 N. Y. S. 684 (1918) ; Haskins v. Kendall, 158 Mass.
224, 33 N. E. 495 (1893) ; In re Burza's Estate, 274 N. Y. S. 614 (1934).
8 Mutual Relief Ass'n v. Ray, 173 Ark. 9, 292 S. W. 396 (1927).
9 Allen v. Gaar, 160 So. 156 (La. App., 1935).
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erty interest which he may assign ;10 that his right to the cash
surrender value of the policy passes to the trustee in bank-
ruptcy,"' and that he can change the beneficiary without the lat-
ter's consent.
12
Since it is a general rule that an expectancy cannot become
the subject of a trust,13 it might appear at first glance that a life
insurance trust predicated on the interest which the trustee pos-
sesses as beneficiary under a revocable life insurance policy must
fail for lack of a sufficient res. Nevertheless, where this question
has presented itself, most courts have held that a valid trust is
created. An expectancy which is based upon the probability that
a devisee or legatee will ultimately receive a property interest
from the estate of a living person, can be distinguished from the
character of interest which a beneficiary possesses under a life
insurance policy. In the former instance, the expectancy is
founded upon an instrument which is ambulatory in nature, and
is ineffective to pass any present interest in property. In the case
of a life insurance policy, the interest of the beneficiary arises
out of a subject matter which has a present existence. An insur-
ance contract is effective to establish the relative rights of the
parties thereto immediately upon execution thereof even though
the right of enjoyment of the proceeds is postponed until after
the death of the insured. 1 4 In treating a life insurance policy as
a valid third party contract, the possibility of construing a life
insurance trust as a testamentary disposition is effectively elimi-
nated.15
No doubt the peculiar character of the life insurance contract
is due to its multiple nature which embraces a tangible property
right as well as an interest inchoate in nature. As one court has
said, "While an insurance policy is property, it is peculiar prop-
erty."16 To the extent that it possesses a cash surrender or loan
value available to the insured, it represents a tangible property
right. However, in most insurance policies this right is only inei-
10 Martin v. Stubbings, 126 I1. 387, 18 N. E. 657 (1888) ; Atlantic Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Gannon, 179 Mass. 291, 60 N. E. 933 (1901) ; Moon v. Wil-
liams, 102 Fla. 214, 135 So. 555 (1931) ; Malone v. Cohn, 236 F. 882 (1916).
11 Cohen v. Samuels, 245 U. S. 50, 62 L. Ed. 143 (1917).
12 Causey v. State Life Ins. Co., 17 La. App. 545, 135 So. 747 (1931).
13 Bogert on Trusts (West Pub. Co., 1935), II, 355; In re Ellenborough,
[1903] 1 Ch. 697; Matter of Gurlitz, 172 N. Y. S. 523 (1918) ; In re Lynde's
Estate, 175 N. Y. S. 289 (1919).
14 Johnson v. Scott, 137 N.Y.S. 243 (1912).
15 Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327, 73 L. Ed. 405
(1929) ; Tyler v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 226 Mass. 306, 115 N. E.
300 (1917) ; Katz v. Witt, 134 N.Y.S. 675 (1911).
16 Burlinghame v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459, 57 L. Ed. 920 (1913).
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dental to the primary object of providing for the creation of a
fund to arise upon the death of the insured. The creation of this
right in the beneficiary, which admittedly possesses inchoate and
ambulatory aspects, is what gives an insurance contract its dis-
tinctive personality and represents the primary motive in induc-
ing the insured to enter into the contract. It is to be observed
that the dual nature of life insurance policies was recognized by
Congress in passing Section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act, 17 which
gives the bankrupt the privilege of paying the loan value of the
policy to the trustee and retaining the policy free from interfer-
ence from creditors.
Irrespective of what descriptive label has been affixed by the
courts in attempting to define the beneficiary's interest in situa-
tions not involving life insurance trusts, most courts have held
such an interest, however slender, of sufficient substance to sup-
port a trust. The case of Hirsh v. Auer' s is frequently cited in
support of the validity of a life insurance trust. In this case the
deceased, father of the plaintiff, held a certificate of insurance
payable to his wife. Upon the latter's death, he made the policy
payable to his sister, Clara, who promised him that she would
divide fifteen hundred dollars of the proceeds equally between
herself and the decedent's two children. The action was brought
by the children to enforce the trust. In holding for the plaintiffs,
the court said: "It was competent for Clara Auer to agree with
her brother that she would receive the proceeds of his life insur-
ance, subject to such a trust as he might create. The fact that
the insured could have at any time changed the beneficiary named
in his certificate has no bearing upon the question now presented.
He did not as a matter of fact exercise that right, and his sister
collected the insurance impressed with the trust created by the
agreement which the trial court has found was made by the par-
ties in interest. The fact that the trust dealt with a contingent
interest of the insured in the certificate of insurance is of no
moment; that interest became vested at the death of the insured,
and since the beneficiary collected the insurance money, the trust
under the agreement creating and acknowledging it, attached to
the fund. "A trust of this nature is not to be distinguished from
assignments of contingent interests which courts of equity recog-
nize as valid."
A similar trust was sustained by the court in Massachusetts, 19
17 U. S. C. A., Tit. 11, § 110 (a), p. 277. See Malone v. Cohn, 236 F. 882(1916) ; Burlinghame v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459, 57 L. Ed. 920 (1913).
18 146 N. Y. 13, 40 N. E. 397 (1895).
19 Kendrick v. Ray, 173 Mass. 305, 53 N. E. 823 (1899).
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although the facts as stated do not disclose whether or not the
insured reserved the power to change the beneficiary. The New
York court was again confronted with the problem in Lauterbach
v. New York Investment Company.20 There the insured held
several policies which named his wife as beneficiary. Later, he
changed the policies so as to make them payable to Alfred Lauter-
bach and enclosed them with a letter directing the beneficiary to
make a disposal of the proceeds in accordance with the instruc-
tions contained in the letter. The policies and the letter were
left with a clerk in Lauterbach's office and were not delivered to
the latter until after the insured's death. An action was insti-
tuted by the wife of the deceased in an attempt to defeat the trust
on the ground that it was invalid because of the insured's failure
to have it executed in accordance with the statute of wills. The
estate was insolvent and the creditors of the insured intervened.
The court sustained the trust, holding that it was not an at-
tempted testamentary disposition even though the insured re-
tained the right to change the beneficiary.
In Lashley v. Lashley,2 ' the insured was entitled to war risk
insurance and proposed to his brother that the latter be named
as beneficiary for the benefit of the latter and a brother and sister
of the insured. This agreement was reached between the two
and after the insured died the brother and sister started suit to
compel the trustee to carry out the provisions of the trust. In
sustaining the trust, the court held that the fact that the trustdealt with a contingent i ters't did n-o+ impair its 1 a.
quoted in support of its holding the language used by the court
in Hirsh v. Auer.22
The case of Bose v. Meury2s involves a set of facts which per-
mits the court to pass upon the validity of a life insurance trust
free from the influence of any circumstances creating equities in
favor of those attempting to enforce the trust. In this case one
Meury insured his life in several insurance companies in favor
of his wife and children, retaining the right to change the bene-
ficiaries. Thereafter he established a trust making a trust com-
pany beneficiary under the policies. The trust company agreed to
hold the proceeds of the policies subject to a life interest in favor
of Meury's wife, remainder to his children. The insured reserved
the right to add to the trust or to withdraw policies already de-
20 117 N. Y. S. 152 (1909).
21 212 Ala. 255, 102 So. 229 (1924).
22 146 N. Y. 13, 40 N. E. 397 (1895). See also Christensen v. Christen-
sen, 14 F. (2d) 375 (1926).
23 112 N. J. Eq. 62, 163 A. 276 (1932).
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posited. The right to revoke the trust was reserved by the
settlor. Meury withdrew several policies and pledged them with
Bose as security for a five thousand dollar loan. The insured
died before the loan was repaid, and the proceeds of the policies
were paid to Bose, who filed a bill of interpleader after deducting
the amounts due him on the loan. The parties interpleaded were
the trust company and the insured's administrator. The estate
was insolvent and the creditors of the decedent were allowed to
intervene. The administrator and the creditors attacked the
validity of the trust contending that it was not completed during
the lifetime of the decedent, because the latter reserved the right
to change the beneficiary under the policies as well as the right to
revoke the trust and withdraw the policies. In upholding the
validity of the trust, the court said: ". . . the res is the proceeds
of the insurance in the life of the trustor which were never his
property. The proceeds are the fulfillment of the promises by the
insurance company to the Montclair Trust Company, Trustee, to
pay the stipulated sums upon the death of the insured. The
insured paid the consideration for the promise, and he had the
right under the terms of the policy to change the promises at will,
but when the day came-the insured's death-the obligations of
the insurance company were due to the Montclair Trust Com-
pany, trustee. Its source of title was the promise in the policies,
not the trust agreement."
This problem was presented to the Illinois Supreme Court for
the first time in (hurnett v. Mutual Life Insurane Company.2 4
The facts were as follows: Ames, the insured, deposited various
life insurance policies in trust with the Central Trust Company
under an agreement whereby the trustee agreed to hold the poli-
cies during the lifetime of the insured and after his death to
collect the proceeds and administer them for the benefit of the
wife and children of the insured. Ames reserved the right to
change the beneficiary under the policies; to withdraw them
from the trust, and to pledge the cash surrender value. In addi-
tion, he retained the right to modify or revoke the trust. Pre-
miums on the policies were to be paid by the settlor. Ames died
heavily indebted to the plaintiffs who brought an action attacking
the validity of the trust, and praying that the trust be declared
void and the proceeds of the policies be administered as assets of
the insured's estate. No fraud was alleged. The main ground
relied upon by the plaintiffs was that the trust failed, because the
interest which a beneficiary owns under a revocable life insurance
24 356 Ill. 618, 191 N. E. 253 (1934).
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policy is a mere expectancy which could not be the subject of
a trust, and, since the trust was invalid from its inception, the
proceeds of the policies became a part of the insured's estate.
This view was rejected by the Illinois court in holding that a
valid trust was established during the lifetime of the settlor. In
effect the court held that the right of the beneficiary to receive the
proceeds of the policies possessed sufficient attributes of property
to serve as the res of a trust. The court said: "The date of the
death of the insured merely fixed the time when the obligation
of the insurer to pay and the right of the beneficiary to receive
the proceeds of the policies became enforceable. The trust agree-
ment and the change of the beneficiary, however, became effective
during the lifetime of the settlor. The continuing right to receive
the proceeds of an insurance policy is not impaired by the un-
exercised right or privilege of the insured to designate another
beneficiary. The designation of a beneficiary in a policy of life
insurance creates an inchoate gift of the proceeds of the policy,
which if not revoked by the insured in his lifetime rests in the
beneficiary at the time of the former's death. A policy of life
insurance is not deemed an asset of the estate of the insured un-
less it is made payable to him, his executors or administrators.
The mere fact that the insured may change the beneficiary does
not make the policy or its proceeds part of the estate."
The court also held that the naming of a new beneficiary in the
policies would produce the same result as the act of the settlor in
revoking the trnst. In support of its position, the co urt cited
Otis v. Beckwith25 where the insured, in making the settlement of
the trust, executed an assignment of the policy, which assignment
was registered on the records of the insurance company. After
the insured died, the trustee filed a bill to compel the administra-
tor to surrender the policy. The court upheld the validity of the
trust, laying stress on the fact that it was the intention of the
insured to establish a trust for his motherless children, and the
acts of the insured in executing an assignment, causing the same
to be recorded, and appointing the plaintiff trustee, were sufficient
to establish the trust. It must be noted, however, that ir this
case the assured assigned the policy to the trustee, an act which
is to be distinguished from the right of the insured to change the
beneficiary. An assignment rests upon contract, while the power
to change a beneficiary is in the nature of a power of appoint-
ment.26 The effect of an assignment is to vest in the trustee all
25 49 Ill. 121 (1868).
26 Vance on Insurance (2d ed., West Pub. Co., 1930), Ch. 10, pp. 564,
565, sec. 147.
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the rights which the insured owns in the policy so that the
trustee takes a vested interest therein, even though the insured
may possess the right to revoke or cancel the assignment. Hence,
an insurance trust which has for its res an assignment of the
policy has long been recognized as valid.27
In the Gurnett case, the Supreme Court brushed this distinc-
tion aside, holding that the effect of the insured's acts in setting
up a trust by assigning his interest in the policy or by changing
the beneficiary thereunder are of the same practical effect, laying
stress on the fact that the intention of the settlor is the same in
both instances.
A divided Kansas court reached an opposite conclusion, 28 hold-
ing that a sufficient property interest was not passed to the trus-
tee. Fisher v. Donovan29 and Bennett v. Rosborough8 ° are the
only other cases found representing the minority view. In both
of these, efforts were made by the creditors of the decedent to en-
force a trust based upon the promise of the wife of the deceased
to pay the latter's debts from the proceeds of insurance policies
which would be paid to her as beneficiary. The decisions in both
of these cases are influenced by the existence of a statute enacted
for the purpose of protecting the beneficiaries of life insurance
policies from the claims of creditors.
In Chase National Bank v. United States,81 the court held the
proceeds of a revocable life insurance policy subject to the death
transfer tax imposed upon the estate of the insured, and stated
that the termination of the power of the insured to control the
disposition of the property is a legitimate subject of the tax. The
court, however, recognized that the proceeds of the policies were
not taxable as the decedent's property, saying: ". . . it is true as
emphasized by the plaintiff... the interest of the beneficiary in
the insurance policies effected by the decedent 'vested' in them
before his death and that the proceeds of the policies came to the
beneficiary not directly from the decedent but from the insurer."
The policy of the courts in sustaining the validity of life insur-
ance trusts is not only consonant with sound principles of law but
also is in accord with the best interests of public policy. This
means of providing for the welfare, education, and support of
dependents after the death of the insured is one that should be
27 Fortesque v. Barnett, 40 Eng. Rep. 14, 3 My. & K. 36 (1834) ; Jarvis
v. Binkley, 206 Ill. 531, 69 N. E. 582 (1904).
28 Staples v. Murray, 124 Kan. 730, 262 P. 558 (1928).
29 57 Neb. 361, 77 N. W. 778 (1899).
80 155 Ga. 265, 116 S. E. 788 (1923).
81 278 U. S. 327, 73 L. Ed. 405 (1929).
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encouraged. In most instances the trust agreement is a carefully
prepared instrument in which the advice of experienced counsel
is drawn upon in devising a satisfactory plan suitable to the
individual needs of the settlor. Many of the perplexing problems
which are inherent in the disposition of property by means of a
will can be eliminated.
A. SAMUELS
